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PEARSON v. CALLAHAN AND QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY: IMPACT ON FIRST AMENDMENT
LAW
BY DAVID L. HUDSON, JR.

INTRODUCTION

At first glance, a search and seizure case involving informants,
the consent-once-removed doctrine,' and other Fourth Amendment
concepts would seemingly have little connection to freedom of
expression. 2 Commentators have noted, however, that, despite the case's
scant media coverage,3 the United States Supreme Court's 2008 decision
in Pearson v. Callahan4 has had a substantial impact on First
Amendment litigation.
The Court's decision in Pearsondealt with qualified immunitya doctrine that enables government officials to avoid liability if they have
not violated clearly established constitutional or statutory law.' The case
. David L. Hudson, Jr. serves as a First Amendment Scholar for the First
Amendment Center (http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org). He also teaches First
Amendment classes at Vanderbilt Law School and the Nashville School of Law.
1. The consent-once-removed doctrine means that a suspect or defendant can
give consent even though he does not directly give consent to the police. Under this
theory, the suspect gives consent when he allows an individual, such as an
informant, to enter his home. The consent given to the informant is then transmuted
to the police.
2. David L. Hudson, Jr., 4th Amendment Ruling Could Influence First
Amendment Law, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER ONLINE (Jan. 27, 2009),

http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/4th-amendment-ruling-could-influence-firstamendment-law.
3. Michelle Friedland et. al., A Shift in ConstitutionalTort Jurisprudence,SAN
FRANCISCO ATT'Y: SUPREME COURT WATCH (The Bar Ass'n of San Francisco, San

Francisco, CA) (Summer, 2009), http://www.sfbar.org/forms/sfam/q22009/supreme
court-watch q2_09.pdf.
4. 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
5. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
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involved criminal defendant, Afton Callahan, and his sale of
methamphetamine to an informant working for a drug taskforce in
Millard County, Utah. 6 The wired informant gave an arrest signal to
officers in the area, who then arrested Callahan on drug charges.
Callahan asserted that the officers violated his Fourth
Amendment rights with their warrantless search and arrest. A trial court
ruled that the officers' warrantless search was justified by exigent
circumstances. 9 The Court of Appeals for the State of Utah reversed,
finding that the search was unconstitutional under exigent circumstances
(which the State conceded) or the inevitable discovery rule.'o
Callahan then filed a constitutional tort claim in federal court
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983," asserting a violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights.12 The federal district court granted the state officials qualified
immunity, finding that a reasonable officer may have believed that the
consent-once-removed doctrine could apply when Callahan gave consent
to the informant to come into his home. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit
reversed, finding that the officers were not entitled to qualified
immunity.14 The court reasoned that the officers knew or should have
known that their conduct was unlawful because they knew they did not
have a warrant and knew that Callahan did not consent to the police
entering his home. 15
The United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed, writing
that "[w]hen the entry at issue here occurred in 2002, the 'consent-onceremoved' doctrine had gained acceptance in the lower courts."' 6
But the Court did something much more important than rule that
the officers were entitled to qualified immunity in the specific civil rights
6. Pearson,555 U.S. at 227-28.
7. Id at 228.

8. Id at 227.
9. Id

10. Id. at 228 (citing State v. Callahan, 93 P.3d 103 (Utah Ct. App. 2004)).
11. Section 1983 serves as the statutory vehicle for constitutional tort claims.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
12. Pearson,555 U.S. at 229.
13. Id. (citing Callahan v. Millard Cnty., No. 2:04-CV-00952, 2006 WL
1409130 (2006)).
14. Id. (citing Callahan v. Millard Cnty., 494 F.3d 891, 895-99 (2007)).
15. Id. at 230 (citing Callahan,494 F.3d at 899).

16. Id. at 244.
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case of Alton Callahan. The Court ruled that lower court judges could
decide qualified-immunity questions by avoiding the often difficult issue
of whether there was a constitutional violation and proceed directly to
the inquiry of whether such a right was clearly established.17
Previously, in Saucier v. Katz, the Court had determined that
the initial questions to be addressed in a qualified-immunity case were
(1) whether there was a violation of a constitutional right and (2) whether
that right was clearly established at the time of defendants' conduct.' 9
Some Justices, however, criticized the Saucier approach. Justice Stephen
Breyer referred to it as the "failed Saucier experiment." 20 The problem
with the "rigid order of battle" 2 1 mandated by Saucier was that the first
question-whether there has been a constitutional violation-is often a
much more difficult question to resolve than the second question of
whether the law was clearly established. 22
In Pearson, Justice Samuel Alito, Jr. explained that before
Saucier, judges had the option of whether to apply the steps sequentially
21
Justice Alito
or to proceed directly to the clearly established prong.
then explained that the experience with Saucier showed that it was too
inflexible and should be abandoned in favor of giving the judges needed
discretion.24 He stated: "On reconsidering the procedure required in
Saucier, we conclude that while the sequence set forth there is often
appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory." 2 5

17. Id. at 227, 243-44.
18. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
19. Id. at 197.
20. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 432 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in
judgment and dissenting in part).
21. Brousseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring)
("Indeed when courts' dockets are crowded, a rigid 'order ofbattle' makes little
administrative sense and can sometimes lead to a constitutional decision that is
effectively insulated from review.").
22. See Hudson, supra note 2.
23. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 234 (2009).
24. Id at 234-35 (citing cases in which courts disagreed with the "rigid"
Saucier standard).
25. Id. at 236.
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Justice Alito quoted one complaint which regarded Saucier as a
"'puzzling misadventure in constitutional dictum."' 2 6 He also cited
numerous colleagues on the Court who questioned the mandatory
27
sequence of Saucier.
However, Justice Alito wrote that, even though no longer
mandatory, the two-step protocol is "often beneficial" in part because it
"promotes the development of constitutional precedent." 28 He reasoned
that lower federal district and circuit court judges are in the best position
29
to determine how to analyze qualified-immunity cases.
Scholars have questioned whether Pearson would impede the
development of constitutional law. For example, law professor Michael
Wells has stated that the decision "will make it easier for courts to decide
that the law is unsettled, grant qualified immunity and not get to the
merits of important constitutional questions.... Now there is always an
argument against facing them." 3 0 Professor John Jeffries, Jr. warned that
the Pearson decision, at times, could lead to the "degradation of
constitutional rights."31
As one commentator wrote, "Pearson'sholding has, if anything,
intensified the debate over the proper procedural framework for
addressing qualified-immunity claims."32 Other scholars have identified
the "post-Pearson" period as crucial to studying the vitality of § 1983
.
.
.
.33
civil rights litigation.
This piece surveys the impact that Pearson has already had on
First Amendment law.

26. Id. at 234 (quoting Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution:Dicta
About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1275 (2006)).

27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 234-35.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 242.
See Hudson, supranote 2.

31. John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts,

2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 120 (2009).
32. Nancy Leong, The Saucier QualifiedImmunity Experiment: An Empirical
Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667, 668 (2009).
33. Greg Sobolski & Matt Steinberg, An Empirical Analysis of Section 1983
Qualified Immunity Actions and Implications of Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L.

REV. 523, 556 (2010).
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I. IMPACT ON FIRST AMENDMENT LAW

Judges have seized upon the enhanced flexibility to grant
qualified immunity provided by Pearson v. Callahan and impacted
numerous areas of First Amendment law. For example, the Tenth Circuit
utilized its newfound discretion to grant qualified immunity to Park City,
Utah officials who prohibited a visual artist from selling his work in
In Christensen v. Park City Municipal
public parks and streets.
Corp., the court remarked, "Fortunately, very recently, while this
opinion was being prepared, the Supreme Court jettisoned its prior
holding that courts in qualified-immunity cases must determine whether
the plaintiffs constitutional rights were violated before turning to
whether the asserted right was clearly established." 3 6 The court went on
to note that "[t]his case is a prime example of when the discretion to
avoid the first half of the Sauciertwo-step should be exercised." 3 7
A. Student Speech
Pearson's discernable impact in several areas of the law is
especially apparent in student speech. This is understandable in a certain
sense, as many questions in student speech remain deeply divided and
controversial.38 Consider the example of student online speech-an area
fraught with uncertainty. The Second Circuit ruled that public school
officials in Burlington, Connecticut were entitled to qualified immunity
when they disciplined a high school student for criticizing school
officials with intemperate language on the Internet. 39 "We do not reach

34. See generally Christensen v. Park City Mun. Corp., 554 F.3d 1271 (10th
Cir. 2009); see also David L. Hudson, Jr., Utah Artist Feels Impact of High Court
Decision,FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER ONLINE (Feb. 16, 2009), http://

www.firstamendmentcenter.org/utah-artist-feels-impact-of-high-court-decision.
35. 554 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 2009).
36. Christensen, 554 F.3d at 1277 (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223

(2009)).
37. Id. at 1278.
38. See generally, DAVID L. HUDSON JR., LET THE STUDENTS SPEAK: A
HISTORY OF THE FIGHT FOR FREE EXPRESSION (Beacon Press, 2011).

39. Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011), cert.denied,No. 11-113,
2011 WL 3204853 (U.S. Oct. 31, 2011).
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the question whether school officials violated Doninger's First
Amendment rights by preventing her from running for Senior Class
Secretary," the Second Circuit wrote. 4 0 "We see no need to decide this
question. We agree with the district court that any First Amendment right
allegedly violated here was not clearly established." 4 1 Other courts have
questioned whether there is any clearly established law with respect to
42
school officials' regulation of students' online speech.
The Ninth Circuit recently considered an interesting case
involving a student who filed an Establishment Clause challenge based
on a series of comments made by his Advanced Placement History
teacher that allegedly showed hostility toward Christianity and religion
in general.43 In C.F. v. Capistrano Unified School District,4 the Ninth
Circuit had little trouble with moving to the "clearly established" prong
in part because the case was considered unique. It reasoned, "We have
little trouble concluding that the law was not clearly established at the
time of the events in question - there has never been any reported case
holding that a teacher violated the Establishment Clause by making
statements in the classroom that were allegedly hostile to religion." 46
While many may agree with this holding, the court ultimately erred in
declining to address whether the teacher's alleged hostility toward
47
religion in class crossed the line for Establishment Clause purposes.
Had the court done so, it would have given better guidance to students,
teachers and school administrators in an area of First Amendment law
48
known as a culture war.

40. Id. at 346.
4 1. Id.
42. See, e.g., T.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., No. 1:09-CV-290-PPS,
2011 WL 3501698 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 10, 2011).
43. C.F. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2011).
44. Id.
45. See id. at 986.
46. Id
47. Id.
48. See JONATHAN ZIMMERMAN, WHOSE AMERICA? CULTURE WARS IN
AMERICA'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2002).
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B. PublicEmployee Speech

Public employee First Amendment jurisprudence is especially
susceptible to the Pearson analysis. For years, the seminal test for
determining the free-speech rights of public employees was the
Pickering-Connick test derived from Pickering v. Board of Education49

and modified by Connick v. Myers.so Under this test, a public employee
had to show that his or her speech touched on matters of public concern
or public importance.5 1 This threshold prong was designed to "weed out"
52
claims that were more akin to personal grievances. If employee speech
touches on matters of public concern, the analysis proceeds to a
balancing prong. Under such balancing, the court weighs the
employee's free-speech rights against the employer's efficiency interests
in a disruptive-free workplace.
In 2006, the United States Supreme Court added another
threshold inquiry in Garcetti v. Ceballos. Under Garcetti, a public
employee has to show that he spoke as a citizen, not as an employee.6 In
other words, he must show that his speech does not relate to his official
job duties. As a result of this standard, the Court ruled in the case that
an assistant district attorney's internal office memorandum
recommending dismissal of a criminal case was part of his official duties
rather than expression he would have made as a citizen.
Courts struggle mightily with all three prongs of this public
employee free-speech test: (1) whether an employee is speaking as an
employee or a citizen ("the Garcetti" prong); (2) whether the speech
touches on a matter of public concern; and (3) the balancing prong.

49. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
50. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
51. Id. at 142.

52. Pengtian Ma, Public Employee Speech and Public Concern: A Critique of
the U.S. Supreme Court's ThresholdApproach to Public Employee Speech Cases, 30
J. MARSHALL L. REv. 121, 124-25 (1996).

53. Connick, 461 U.S. at 149-50.
54. Id.
55. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
56. Id. at 421.
57. Id

58. Id.
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Because of the difficulty and complexity of the test's prongs, several
lower courts have used the Pearsonshortcut.
For example, in Stickley v. Sutherly, 9 the Fourth Circuit
determined that a police chief and town manager were entitled to
qualified immunity even though they took disciplinary action against a
police officer right after the officer spoke out against his demotion.so
The Fourth Circuit analyzed this issue by stating, "[H]aving reviewed the
substantive law governing employee speech, we are persuaded that the
law in this area is not 'clearly established' such that a reasonable person
would have known what the law necessarily required in many cases."6 1
The court reasoned that the Supreme Court's public-concern testdetermining whether employee speech speaks to important public
issues-leads "to the conclusion that an employee's right to speech in
any particular situation will often not be immediately evident." 62
The Seventh Circuit used Pearson to grant qualified immunity to
prison officials who transferred an Illinois assistant deputy director after
he voluntarily testified on behalf of an inmate at a Prisoner Review
Board.63 Specifically, in Mastrisciano v. Randle, the assistant deputy
director, Ronald Mastrisciano, testified on behalf of inmate Harry
Aleman, at Aleman's parole hearing.65 The testimony was controversial,
in part, because Aleman was a defendant who had obtained an acquittal
on murder charges in the early 1970's.66 It was later determined that
67
Aleman had bribed the trial judge. The appeals court explained that
"[iln these particular circumstances, the law at the time was not such that
reasonable officials would know that transferring Matrisciano [the
assistant deputy director] after his testimony before the Board was
unlawful."68 However, the Seventh Circuit has determined that retaliating

59. 416 F. App'x 268 (4th Cir. 2011).
60. See id
61. Id. at 272.
62. Id.
63. Matrisciano v. Randle, 569 F.3d 723 (7th CiT. 2009), abrogatedby Fairley
v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2009).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 727.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 735.
68. Id.
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against public employees after testimony in court or at other hearings
constitutes unlawful retaliation.69
The Second Circuit has relied upon Pearson to bypass the first
prong of the Saucier test and, in doing so, determined that eight
Connecticut state officials did not violate clearly established law when
they removed the former executive director and general counsel of the
State Ethics Commission for criticizing their conduct during his
disciplinary hearing.70 In Plofsky v. Giuliano,1 the Second Circuit
bluntly stated, "Here, we exercise our discretion to move immediately to
the second step of the qualified immunity analysis." 7 2 Because of the
short-circuited qualified-immunity analysis, the Second Circuit's
decision fails to provide future public employee litigants with a sense of
where their free-speech rights begin and end in employment retaliation
cases.
C. Inmates
Perhaps because inmate litigation comprises such a sizeable
portion of the dockets for federal district courts, 73 the Pearson shortcut
has been embraced in these courts. Even though the Prison Litigation
Reform Act 74 has made it tougher for inmates to pursue litigation, they

69. See, e.g., Shimer v. Washington, 100 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining

that where a prison guard is willing to testify on behalf of a prisoner, "[t]he prison
administration must proffer some evidence to support its restriction of prison guards'
constitutional rights"). Admittedly, the Seventh Circuit took great pains in its
Matrosciano decision to distinguish its earlier Shimer decision. Matrosciano, 569

F.3d at 735-36.
70. Plofsky v. Giuliano, 375 F. App'x 151, 153 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Pearson
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)).
71. 375 F.App'x 151.
72. Id. at 153.
73. Brian Bowling, Prisoner Lawsuits on the Rise as Inmate Population
Increases, PITTSBURGH TRIB. REV., Feb. 15, 2010, http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/

pittsburghtrib/news/pittsburgh/s_667221 .html.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 19 9 7 e (2011), unconstitutional as applied, Siggers-El v.
Barlow, 433 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
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still file a large number of lawsuits. One California federal magistrate
judge acknowledged this reality and stated, "And nothing we're able to
do will ever stem the tide of prisoner lawsuits."7 6
One way for courts to deal with the sheer mass of prisoner
lawsuits is to handle as many cases in an expedited fashion. Enter
Pearson v. Callahan and qualified immunity, as sometimes courts m
inmate cases follow the traditional two-step Saucier procedure.77 But the
Ninth Circuit recently used Pearson and its grant of discretion to courts
to give prison officials qualified immunity, even though they instituted
an eighteen-month ban on visits from minors.78 A federal district court
also cited Pearson in finding that prison officials were entitled to
qualified immunity when they denied a Muslim inmate prayer oils.79
Another federal district court held that officials were entitled to qualified
immunity over a Nation of Islam inmate's allegations that his
constitutional and statutory rights were violated by the denial of his
request for a Halal meal.80 A federal district court in Massachusetts
declined to resolve the question of which constitutional standard from the
United States Supreme Court should apply in a challenge by an inmate
alleging he had a First Amendment right to send e-mail to family

75. Wendy Davis, Unlocking the Lawsuit: Efforts Mount to Loosen the Chains
on a Prisoner Litigation Statute, 96 A.B.A. J. 14, 14 (2010) (discussing the

consequences of the Prison Litigation Reform Statute).
76. Eastern Districtof CahforniaSwamped by Prisoner Lawsuits, THE THIRD
BRANCH (July 2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/TheThirdBranch/10-07-Oi/
EasternDistrictof California Swamped byPrisoner Lawsuits.aspx.

77. See e.g., Black v. Calunga, 656 F. Supp. 2d 625, 633 (E.D. Tex. 2009)
(holding that "[t]he Supreme Court mandated that courts must employ a two-step
sequence in evaluating whether government officials are entitled to qualified
immunity claims").
78. Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1199-1201 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that
government officials were entitled to qualified immunity when they temporarily
revoked a prisoner's visitation rights because the prisoner had a sexually explicit
phone conversation with his wife while their minor child was also on the line).
79. Castle v. Hedgpeth, No. 1:08-CV-01754-AWI-SMS, 2011 WL 3207774, at
*3, *6-7 (E.D. Cal. July 27, 2011).
80. McDaniels v. Fischer, No. C1O-8230MJP-JPD, 2011 WL 79588, at *20
(W.D. Wash. July 17, 2011) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009);
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).
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members. 8 ' Rather than resolving the question, the court conveniently
relied on Pearson and found no clearly established right.82
Another federal district court cited Pearsonfavorably in denying
The
an inmate's right to receive any erotic magazine subscriptions.
court purported to rely on the "clearly established" prong in awarding
prison officials qualified immunity, though the court seemingly did not
need to do so as it had already determined there was no underlying valid
First Amendment claim.84 In another recent decision, a federal district
court in Texas dismissed a prison inmate's First Amendment retaliation
claim by granting officials qualified immunity.85 Here, the court noted
the two prongs to the test for qualified immunity and maintained that,
under Pearson, the court had "discretion 'in deciding which of the two
prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first"' 86
The court, however, ultimately decided the case based on the "clearly
established" prong.
As another example, a federal district court in Oregon granted
qualified immunity to prison officials who censored an inmate's
outgoing letters for containing racial and ethnic slurs.8 The court
reasoned that there was no clearly established right for an inmate to send
letters with such hateful language.89

81. Parisi v. Lappin, No. 10-40030-GAO, 2011 WL 1045016, at *4 (D. Mass.
Mar. 18, 2011). The district court identified a dispute in the lower courts over
whether the higher scrutiny from Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), or the
rational basis standard of Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), should apply. Id. at
*2.
82. Id at *4 ("The Court need not decide here which standard is appropriate,
because Parisi's claims fail in any event because of the doctrine of qualified
immunity.").
83. Frazier v. Ortiz, No. 07-cv-02131-CMA-KMT, 2010 WL 924254 (D. Colo.
Mar. 10, 2010).
84. Id. at *6-8.
85. Shelton v. Lemons, No. H-10-0452, 2011 WL 3648121, at *11 (S.D. Tex.
Aug. 17, 2011).
86. Id. (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)).
87. id
88. Barrett v. Belleque, No. 06-510-JE, 2011 WL 802707 (D. Or. Mar. 1,
2011).
89. Id at *7.
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Unfortunately, many people in society do not care about prisoner
rights. They reason that people that violate legal norms and harm others
do not deserve the various protections the Constitution provides. 90 The
sheer amount of inmate litigation, however, and the fact that there appear
to be so many deprivations of First Amendment rights within the prison
context, should compel the courts to more clearly articulate the
parameters of constitutional freedoms. 91
II. THE PEARSON PROBLEM
The First Amendment rights of students, public employees, and
prisoners are just some areas noticeably impacted by Pearson and
represent only a narrow part of First Amendment jurisprudence. The
Pearson decision gives judges the discretion to avoid tough
constitutional questions and decide cases based on the "clearly
established" prong in other situations as well.92 One law professor has
referred to the decision as an example of "procedural judicial activism." 93
As such, Pearson certainly gives judges more power to avoid deeper
constitutional analysis and dismiss cases in a more expedited fashion; a
reality especially problematic in the First Amendment arena.
Specifically, a serious problem could emerge if lower court
94
judges regularly cite Pearsonto avoid the Sauciertwo-prong approach.
Courts could simply avoid deciding important constitutional questions
and the law could stagnate, as courts fail to explain when certain
governmental conduct violates First Amendment and other constitutional
90. David L. Hudson Jr., Why I Care About Prisoner Rights, FIRST
AMENDMENT CENTER ONLINE (May 25, 2011), http://www.firstamendmenteenter.org
/why-i-care-about-prisoner-rights.
91. Id.
92. Pearson applies to other constitutional claims. The case itself was decided
on Fourth Amendment grounds and has been applied in many Fourth and Eighth
Amendment cases. It also has been applied in other First Amendment areas. See,
e.g., Wiese v. Casper, 593 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2010) (using Pearson to dismiss
First Amendment claims of protestors at political event, and reasoning that the law
was not clearly established).
93. Goutam U. Jois, Pearson, Iqbal, and ProceduralJudicialActivism, 37 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 901, 901 (2010).
94. Jack M. Beerman, Qualified Immunity and ConstitutionalAvoidance, 2009
SUP. CT. REV. 139, 141 (2010).
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rights. As United States District Judge Lynn Adelman and Jon Dietrich
explained:
While allowing courts to decide the 'easy' question
and avoid the hard one might make sense from a
judicial economy standpoint, it would impede the
development of constitutional law. If courts
regularly decided the question of immunity before
determining whether the defendant had violated a
constitutional right, they would establish few such
96
rights.
Other commentators agree, writing that "there is good reason to
believe that courts will generally elect to decide qualified-immunity
cases solely on the basis of the 'clearly established' prong wherever
possible."
This caveat applies with great force in the First Amendment
context where there are so many difficult, complex and unsettled areas of
law. These include:
*When does speech cross the line from
protected speech into an unprotected true
threat?98
*When does profane speech directed at another
person constitute "fighting words"? 99
*When can school officials punish students for
off-campus speech by reasoning that such

95. Id.
96. Lynn Adelman & Jon Dietrich, Saying What the Law Is: How Certain
Legal Doctrines Impede the Development of ConstitutionalLaw and What Courts
Can Do About It, 2007 FED. CTS. L. REV. 87, 96 (2007).
97. Friedland et. al., supranote 3, at 52.
98. See David L. Hudson, Jr., True Threats, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER
ONLINE (May 12, 2008), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/true-threats ("True
threat jurisprudence remains a muddled mess.").
99. See Robert M. O'Neil, Rights in Conflict: The First Amendment's Third
Century, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 18 (2002) ("The Chaplinsky decision has
caused no end of confusion during the ensuing six decades.").
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substantial

disruption? '"

*When can school officials punish students for
pro-gay and anti-gay themes? 10
*When does a student's insulting speech to a
teacher constitute a threat or "fighting
words"?102
eWhether funeral protest statutes limiting the
time and distance at which protests can take
place are constitutional?l0 3
*Whether speech is classified as political
speech or commercial speech?'
CONCLUSION
The potential remains that federal judges will decide at least
some First Amendment cases on qualified immunity grounds by deciding
simply whether the right was clearly established and not address the
merits of whether certain government conduct violates the First
Amendment in the first place. As Professor Michael Wells stated, "First
Amendment values and constitutional values in general would be better
served by an approach that obliges courts to decide constitutional
questions."
Many courts could avoid deciding important questions of
constitutional law and simply hold, "The right was not clearly
established." This could hinder the development of First Amendment

100. See J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 937 (3rd Cir. 2011)
(Smith, J., concurring) ("Lower courts, however, are divided on whether Tinker's
substantial-disruption test governs students' off-campus expression.").
101. See Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist., 636 F.3d 874 (7th Cir. 2011).
102. See In Re Nickolas S., 245 P.3d 446 (Ariz. 2011).
103. Compare Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2008)
(upholding Ohio funeral protest law) with Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 545 F.3d 685 (8th
Cir. 2008) (finding constitutional problems with a Missouri funeral protest statute).
104. See S.O.C., Inc. v. Cnty. of Clark, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1131-32 (D.
Nev. 2007).
105. See Hudson, supranote 2.
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law and deprive litigants of proper redress.106 Hopefully, federal judges
will take heed of Justice Alito's recognition that the Saucier approach "is
often beneficial",0 7 and "promotes the development of constitutional
precedent." 0 8

106. David L. Hudson, Jr., 4th Court Uses 4th Amendment Ruling to Skirt
Free-Speech Issue, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER ONLINE (May 6, 2010),
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/blog-court-uses-4th-amendment-ruling-toskirt-free-speech-issue.
107. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2008).
108. Id.

